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Introduction 
 
Throughout the OECD Welfare States are under intense pressure. Radical economic and 
social changes have transformed labour markets, increased unemployment and economic 
insecurity, and generated social exclusion and welfare dependency. At the start of the 21st 
century those who are workless or on low incomes often must negotiate multiple and 
fragmented transitions in a landscape beset by continuing change in employment, 
demography and social structures. The welfare settlements created in the era of 
Keynesian full employment have been undermined and Governments of OECD countries 
are engaged in more or less radical strategies to reform their social security and 
employment systems.   
 
The ‘Transitional Labour Market’ (TLM) approach has emerged as one way of analysing 
these changes and of assessing which types of institutional arrangements offer more 
effective strategies for managing risks and easing transitions between ‘the labour market 
and other social systems’ with the aim of reducing social exclusion and recreating 
something like ‘full employment’ (Schmid, 1998; Schmid and Schomann, 2003). The 
findings from the EU funded TLM research programme, carried out between 1996 and 
1999, reflect in part the legacy from the recession of the early 1990s, and were aimed at 
informing the early phases of the European Employment Strategy (EES). Both the EES 
and the TLM approach acknowledge that improved economic performance needed to be 
augmented by reformed institutional arrangements if long term and youth unemployment 
were to be reduced and economic activity rates increased. Schmid placed particular 
emphasis on the role of active labour market programmes and benefit systems that 
needed radical reform with the “modernisation” of the “old-fashioned public employment 
service” (PES) being “crucial” (1998, p. 9). 
 
Since the mid-1990s the pace of such reform has accelerated in many countries, partly as 
a result of the benchmarking and ‘policy transfer’ stimulated by the EES, the OECD 
‘Jobs Strategy’, and by increasingly robust research findings into ‘what works’. 
Throughout the OECD member states have been pursuing diverse ‘welfare to work’ 
strategies to ‘reconfigure’ the ‘interface’ between those dependent on social security 
systems and more flexible labour markets. The emphasis has been on ‘repackaging’ tax 
and benefit entitlements, labour market programmes and employment regulations, to 
‘activate’ benefit systems, improve work incentives and ‘make work pay’. Policy 
attention has also focused on implementation and reform of the employment assistance 
and social security systems through which reform strategies have been delivered. 
 
This paper aims to explore lessons from the evolving ‘welfare to work’ agenda pursued 
by the British New Labour Government which, since 1997, has explicitly grappled with 
many of the key challenges identified in the TLM research programme. The British case 
merits attention because the strategy has explicitly drawn on both neo-liberal ‘Anglo’ and 
social democratic European models and because of its relative success. In 2004 the UK 
was experiencing the highest employment rate amongst the ‘G7’ economies and 
European countries that had previously viewed Britain as the example of what not to do 
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were starting to emulate some of its ‘welfare to work’ reforms (as in the case of the 
‘Hartz’ reforms in Germany). 
 
Much credit for the success of New Labour’s strategy has been attributed to relative 
economic stability and adept macro economic management but Prime Minister Blair has 
emphasised too the contribution made by welfare reform. This paper describes the 
‘welfare to work’ strategy that has been pursued Britain and assesses evidence about its 
impacts and the challenges it faces as it enters what is often described as ‘second wave’ 
welfare reform. It considers the new combinations of employment assistance, labour 
market regulation, tax and benefit reforms, and learning entitlements, which have 
redefined the rights and responsibilities of those making transitions between 
worklessness, caring and employment. It discusses the strengths and weaknesses of this 
new British settlement and explores the contemporary challenge to build on ‘employment 
first’ and promote job retention, skill progression and advancement in the labour market.  
 
The British Benefit and Employment Assistance System  
 
The roots of the post Second World War British Welfare State are to be found in the 
‘Beveridge Report’ on ‘Social Insurance and Allied Services’. This proposed a new 
social security system made up of flat-rate contributions in return for flat-rate benefits, 
covering everything from unemployment insurance to old age pensions. Beveridge 
constructed his proposals on three core assumptions. These were the creation of a 
universal and free National Health Service; the introduction of family allowances (now 
Child Benefit) to ensure, amongst other things, that the cost of children would not 
discourage people from taking up low paid jobs; and the assumption that the Government 
would maintain full employment through Keynesian demand management (Timmins, 
2001). 
 
In contrast with the federal systems of other European and ‘Anglo’ countries, with their 
complex division of policy responsibilities and fragmented social insurance and ‘safety 
net’ benefit delivery systems, the British welfare system was organised through 
hierarchical bureaucracies controlled by central Government Departments. At the ‘front 
line’ unemployment related benefits were delivered through a national network of 
Unemployment Benefit Offices (UBOs) that applied an ‘availability for work’ test. 
Individuals were expected to ‘sign on’ regularly to demonstrate job search and be put in 
contact with job vacancies. A separate social security system, with its own network of 
local offices, delivered benefits to all other claimants. This system of benefits was to 
become ever more complex as the inadequacies of flat-rate insurance benefits were 
exposed and as successive Governments introduced new benefit entitlements and 
increased ‘safety net’ supplementary benefit provisions to combat poverty, especially for 
the elderly and families with children. 
 
Notwithstanding financial pressures, and the ‘rediscovery of poverty’ in the 1960s, the 
system was sustained by the success of the policy of full employment. Between 1945 and 
1970 the British unemployment rate averaged 1.8 per cent and the focus of reform was on 
industrial training and ‘comprehensive manpower policy’ (MSC, 1974). In 1974 a 
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tripartite Manpower Services Commission, modelled on the German system, was 
introduced, and it created an additional network of ‘high street’ Jobcentres that provided 
an employment assistance system for all citizens and a free vacancy filling service for 
employers. This new network of offices was introduced just as the post-war boom was 
ending. Following the oil-price shocks of the 1970s unemployment reached a million in 
1972 and while it fell back rapidly it was to become clear that at each turn of the 
economic cycle unemployment was ‘ratcheting’ upwards and not falling to the levels 
recorded in the previous cycle. 
 
The setting up of Jobcentres apart from UBOs diluted the direct administrative link 
between job search activity and benefit receipt. The management of the system had 
become “passive with no responsibilities to counterbalance the right to benefit” (Wells, 
2001, p. 248). This set-up was linked to a marked increase in unemployment durations. In 
the late 1960s the proportion of those unemployed for over a year averaged 17%, by the 
mid 1980s it increased to 40%. The ‘risk’ of unemployment had increased only slightly 
but it had become “a much more serious event because it takes so much longer, on 
average, to get back into work” (Nickell, 1999, p. 22). Data collected after the 
introduction of the regular Labour Force Survey revealed that a significant number of 
those claiming unemployment benefits were ‘discouraged’ and had effectively stopped 
looking for work. 
 
The ‘Thatcher Era’: Workfare and New Labour’s Inheritance 
 
In the 1980s successive Conservative Governments radically redesigned the employment 
assistance and benefit system. These Governments deregulated much of the British labour 
market, reduced trade union power, privatised nationalised industries, and enabled the 
contracting out of services across much of the public sector. Simultaneously, 
manufacturing employment declined, the service sector grew, female employment 
increased and the labour market was characterised by more ‘flexible’ part time and 
temporary employment contracts. Wage and social inequality increased significantly.  
 
In this period the British approach to welfare reform and employment programmes was 
influenced by two international developments. There was, firstly, an emerging consensus 
on the importance of modernising ‘passive’ benefit systems so that they promoted labour 
market attachment and activity (OECD, 1994; EC, 1996). British politicians and policy 
makers also were much influenced by the US debate on welfare dependency and 
‘workfare’ (Dolowitz, 1998). There was particular interest in the findings from 
experimental evaluations that suggested that welfare caseloads were more effectively 
reduced through a ‘work first’ approach. In these programmes welfare recipients were 
subject to strict job search requirements and immediately attached to available job 
vacancies (Peck, 2004). 
 
During the 1980s Conservative reforms reduced the value and scope of insurance related 
benefits and simplified the social assistance (Income Support) benefit system to contain 
costs and increase financial incentives to work. The role of the PES, its aims and 
objectives and the nature of its activities changed significantly. The first trend was the 
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emphasis on maximising and monitoring the job seeking behaviour of the unemployed. 
This was underpinned by what became known as the ‘stricter benefit regime’ that 
culminated in 1996 with the introduction of a unified ‘Jobseekers Allowance’ for all the 
unemployed. JSA formalised the responsibility of the unemployed to actively look for 
work, to report regularly on their job search activities, and to participate in programmes. 
The intention was that regular administrative interventions would counteract 
disincentives to find work, especially ‘duration dependency’, i.e., the “natural tendency 
for morale and job search to flag the longer a person is unemployed” (Wells, 2001, p. 
247).  
 
The second trend impacting on the ES was the shift towards a ‘work first’ system marked 
by a move towards low cost employment assistance interventions aimed at immediate job 
search and job entry. The third trend was a performance targets regime that was 
increasingly geared to immediate job entry, benefits policing, the reduction of fraud and 
the imposition of sanctions. Finally, the ES was under constant pressure to reduce its 
operating costs and obtain better value for money through ‘contracting out’ and 
benchmarking with the private sector. 
 
By 1996 the British Employment Service (ES) was promoting itself as a high 
performance and high achievement agency, with a reputation for implementing new 
national initiatives to short timescales. It was able to demonstrate that it had been 
administratively effective and had made a contribution to reducing unemployment, 
especially long term unemployment, by engineering a close link between job-broking and 
benefit administration. Evidence showed an immediate and longer-term impact of each of 
the new job search requirements implemented by the ES. The introduction of six monthly 
Restart interviews in 1986 reduced the unemployment count by 8.5% and the 
introduction of JSA was estimated to have reduced the claimant count by between 
100,000 and 200,000, partly due to tighter eligibility rules but also because it had flushed 
out “significant numbers of employed and inactive claimants from the count” (Sweeney 
and McMahon, 1998: 201). Rigorous evaluation evidence, using matched control groups, 
revealed that, over a longer time frame, the new benefit regime stimulated active job 
search and was more effective at linking some unemployed people with job opportunities 
(Rayner et al, 2000; Wells, 2001).  
 
There has, however, been controversy concerning some of the regime’s consequences. 
Sanctions increased and many of the older long-term unemployed were transferred to 
disability benefits or encouraged to take early retirement.  
 
New Labour articulated such criticisms as it developed a different approach to 
unemployment and social exclusion. The then Opposition leadership welcomed the fall in 
unemployment but stressed that it masked the emergence of deep-seated problems. Inter-
generational unemployment, in particular, continued to blight many disadvantaged areas 
and one in five UK households had no one of working age in a job. Economic activity 
rates were generally static; indeed they had fallen for older men. By 1996 nearly one 
million lone parents, mainly women, were dependent on state benefits and the number of 
men receiving incapacity or long term sickness benefits had doubled in a decade to over 
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1.7 million (Gregg and Wadsworth, 1999). Unlike the unemployed, most individuals of 
working age receiving other benefits had little contact with services and were likely to 
remain long-term dependent.  
 
New Labour 
 
In the 1980s the Labour Party opposed what it characterised as the drift towards 
‘workfare’ but in the political transformation into ‘New Labour’ dropped its previous 
opposition to compulsory employment programmes. This change reflected a change in 
New Labour’s macro economic assumptions and in its definition of full employment. 
New Labour had turned to the work of economists who challenged the view that the 
‘NAIRU’ (the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment) had to be as high as it 
was in the UK and in Europe. The new approach suggested that, in addition to greater 
labour market flexibility, ‘supply-side’ measures such as investment in human capital and 
labour market programmes could significantly lower unemployment, reduce public 
expenditure, and help create a more effective labour market (Layard et al, 1991).  
Particular attention was drawn to the experience of Sweden’s ‘active labour market 
policy’ (and other measures) that rendered the country able to hold its unemployment rate 
at round 2 per cent up to the end of the 1980s. The key principle was to prevent long term 
unemployment by offering individuals intensive counselling and help in the first year of 
unemployment and, if they then were still without work, providing them with an income 
only in return for participation in a work or training programme.  
 
By 1995 Gordon Brown, the then Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer, argued that 
Government should not aim to create or preserve jobs directly through macro economic 
management. Its role was to promote macroeconomic stability, economic growth and 
provide ‘economic and employment opportunities for all’. The first priority was to extend 
opportunities for the long term unemployed and, in 1995, he committed a future 
Government to the introduction of a ‘New Deal for Britain’s Under-25s’ (Labour Party, 
1995). 
 
New Labour also argued for much wider reform of the welfare system and has since 
followed much of the approach outlined by the ‘Commission on Social Justice’ (CSJ, 
1994). This fundamental review of the social democratic approach proposed a new vision 
of an ‘intelligent welfare state’ that would “develop from being a safety net to being a 
springboard for economic opportunity”. At the centre of this new vision for the welfare 
state was the judgement that for most working age people “the availability of paid work 
for a fair wage seemed the most secure and sustainable way out of poverty” (Borrie, 
Progress, September 2004).  
 
In 1997, in his first major domestic speech after New Labour’s election victory, Prime 
Minister Blair stated that the “greatest challenge” for his “welfare to work” Government 
was “to refashion our institutions to bring the new workless class back into society and 
into useful work” (PM, 1997). 
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The main priorities: 1997 to 2004 
 
In 1997 ‘New Labour’ committed itself, as one of its five central manifesto ‘pledges’, to 
the introduction of a New Deal for young unemployed people and within weeks of taking 
office the Government gave the ES the lead in delivering its New Deal for Young People 
(NDYP). This programme was financed out of a £5 billion ‘windfall tax’ levied on the 
excess profits of privatised utilities (the proceeds of which underpinned many elements of 
the welfare to work strategy until 2004). The NDYP was followed by the introduction of 
a succession of New Deal programmes for the long-term unemployed, lone parents, 
disabled people, those over 50 and the partners of unemployed people.1 The key 
innovation was the introduction of front line New Deal Personal Advisers (NDPAs) who 
‘personalised’ employment assistance and worked with claimants to identify and tackle 
employment barriers. 
 
The New Deals were integral to New Labour’s ‘rights and responsibilities’ agenda. The 
programmes for unemployed people consolidated the ‘stricter’ JSA regime introduced by 
the Conservative’s, but ‘guaranteed’ intensive employment assistance after a particular 
duration of unemployment. At that point all individual unemployed people must get a 
job, participate in an employment programme, or face possible benefit sanctions. In the 
New Deals for other benefit claimants participation is voluntary. 
 
With unemployment falling, and evidence that the new programmes were delivering job 
outcomes, a more ambitious strategy emerged. In 1998 the Government outlined its “new 
contract for welfare” to rebuild the welfare system “around the principle of work for 
those who can and security for those who cannot” (DSS, 1998, p. iii). The ambition was 
to “change the whole culture of the benefits system” through introducing a “single 
gateway to work” where personal advisers (PAs) would focus on “helping people to 
become independent, rather than locking them into dependency” (ibid, p. 9).  
 
The Government’s strategy involved also policies to ‘make work pay’, including 
reductions in direct taxes on the low paid and in 1999 the introduction of a National 
Minimum Wage (NMW) and the Working Families Tax Credit. There was too gradual 
introduction of a complex package of ‘transition’ initiatives designed to minimise the 
‘risk’ of leaving benefit and meet the immediate costs involved in starting work.  
 
In a Green Paper, released just before the 2001 election victory, the Prime Minister 
directly linked welfare reform with restoring full employment. In a foreword he spoke of 
an “historic opportunity” to build on “economic stability and reform of the welfare state” 
to secure “employment opportunities for all”. This was now New Labour’s ‘modern’ 
                                                 
1 Despite the common framework there are significant differences in the level of resources allocated to 
each programme. Budget estimates show that the better funded New Deals are mandatory and are targeted 
at the registered (usually male) unemployed (HMT, 2002, Table 4.1). Fewer direct resources have been 
allocated to the voluntary employment assistance programmes aimed at lone parents and those receiving 
disability benefits, albeit the strategies for both these groups draw substantially on other forms of public 
expenditure, especially in the shape of tax credits and child care support for lone parents. 
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definition of full employment (DfEE, 2001, p.vi). In 1989 New Labour had also 
committed to ending child poverty ‘within a generation’. 
 
The Government subsequently set itself ambitious targets to increase employment rates 
(especially for lone parents and in the most disadvantaged areas), reduce child poverty 
and tackle social exclusion. Key policy developments included the extension of Working 
Tax Credit to more of the low paid, the separation of financial support for children 
through the Child Tax Credit (now paid to the carer irrespective of employment status), 
and the introduction of mandatory ‘work focused interviews’ (WFIs) for all working age 
benefit claimants. There was major institutional change. A Department of Work and 
Pensions (DWP) was created and ‘Jobcentre Plus’ replaced the ES and Benefits Agency 
(which until then had continued to deliver benefits to working age people through a 
separate network of offices).  
 
Jobcentre Plus became operational in April 2002. The organisation inherited a network of 
1,500 offices and 90,000 ES and BA staff. The aim is that, by 2006, the new agency will 
deliver employment assistance and benefit payments through a network of integrated 
offices where benefit claimants will be assessed and assisted by ‘financial assessors’ and 
PAs. By 2008 it is anticipated that Jobcentre Plus will comprise 1000 front line offices 
supported by 25 ‘contact call centres’. Benefits will be handled in 100 ‘benefit centres of 
excellence’ that will process 1.5 million of the more “complex benefit claims” (Fletcher, 
2004). Staff numbers are planned to fall to 70,000 by 2006, a reduction of over 20%. 
These reductions are to be secured by making extensive use of computers, call centres, 
telephones and on line technologies.  
 
What has worked?  
 
New Labour has made significant progress in reducing unemployment and child poverty 
through its combination of active employment assistance and redistributive tax credits 
within the context of an adept overall macro economic strategy.  
 
Between May 1997 and June 2004 the number of people in work increased from just over 
27 million to just over 28.3 million and the number of unemployed people, calculated by 
the standardised International Labour Office (ILO) definition, fell from over 8 per cent to 
4.7 per cent. The number of unemployed people claiming JSA fell from 1.6 million to 
just under a million. By 2002 long-term continuous claimant unemployment virtually had 
disappeared for those aged under 25, and by 2004 the number of long term unemployed 
JSA claimants aged over 25 had fallen from a peak of over a million in the mid 1980s to 
about 100,000. The overall working age employment rate had increased to 74.6 per cent 
and the employment rate for lone parents had increased from 47% to 53.4% and for 
people with disabilities or health problems from 43.5% to 49% (DWP, 2004).  
 
These general developments do not distinguish the particular impacts made by the 
welfare to work strategy. The most comprehensive evaluation of ‘net’ employment 
effects focused on NDYP. An econometric analysis was independently reviewed by the 
National Audit Office which concluded that on the evidence it was “reasonable” to 
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conclude that in its first two years NDYP was cost effective and directly reduced levels 
of youth unemployment by between 25,000 and 45,000 and increased youth employment 
by between 8,000 and 20,000 (NAO, 2002, Part 3). These findings were broadly 
confirmed by a subsequent evaluation from the Policy Studies Institute (White and Riley, 
2002). More qualitative survey results reported high levels of job satisfaction amongst 
those in work 18 months after starting the programme and reported some evidence of 
wage progression amongst those in employment (Bonjour et al, 2001). Subsequent 
evaluations of the New Deals for the over 25s and for lone parents suggest that these 
programmes too had modest net additional impacts on employment outcomes (Hasluck, 
2002; Evans, 2003).  
 
The strategy also increased the incomes of many of the lowest paid workers. Over 1.3 
million low paid workers benefited from the initial introduction of the NMW, a pattern 
sustained by subsequent increases in the basic rate. The prime beneficiaries have been 
women, part time workers, young people, people with disabilities and some minority ethnic 
groups (LPC, 2003). Given the evidence of few negative employment impacts the 
Government has started to increase the number of people benefiting from the NMW with 
increases of 7% in 2003 and nearly 8% in 2004. The latest increase is predicted to be of 
benefit to 1.6 million low paid workers; with others likely to benefit from the ‘knock on’ 
effect on those employers who set ‘mezzanine’ pay rates for low paid workers just above the 
minimum.  
 
By 2004 2.3 million families were also benefiting from the Working Tax Credit (HMT, 
2004). A study of the combined impact of the NDLP and tax credits concluded that 
together they may have directly increased the lone parent employment rate by about 
80,000 between 1998 and 2002 (Gregg and Harkness, 2003). The Government suggests 
that by 2004 the combination of increased financial support for children, the extension of 
child care facilities, ‘making work pay’, and the increase in lone parent and general 
employment rates had helped lift 600,000 children out of poverty (DWP, 2005, p. 6).  
 
What are the problems? 
 
There have been less favourable assessments of the employment impact of the New Deals. 
Some suggest that the reduction in unemployment simply reflects the strength of the 
economy and others point out that many of those who participate do not get jobs and a 
significant minority of those who get jobs do not retain them. The problems of placement 
and retention are most acute for people from minority ethnic groups, for those with the 
greatest individual barriers, and for those living in areas of highest unemployment. One 
analysis of the programme for young people showed it was most successful in rural areas, 
especially in the South of England, where over half of participants typically entered jobs. 
Job entry rates in the older industrial cities and in inner city London have been as low as 
30 per cent and retention rates are lower often because of the relatively poor quality of 
jobs available. This poor performance has been attributed to the interplay between local 
labour market conditions, the characteristics of participants and the capacity of local 
delivery systems (Sunley and Martin, 2003).  
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Over the life of the New Deals these trends have intensified as NDPAs have struggled to 
place clients with more complex barriers into employment. Currently only 45 per cent of 
those leaving NDYP move into sustained employment with about a third returning directly 
to unemployment and about one in five placed in a job returning to claim JSA within 13 
weeks. Some of these young people are now entering the programme for a second or third 
time. This pattern of ‘recycling’ is likely to emerge in the other New Deals. 
 
There has also been criticism of the ‘make work pay’ strategy, with employers complaining 
about the increased costs of regulation and Opposition Parties highlighting the bureaucratic 
complexity faced by those ‘trapped’ in the ‘tax credit economy’. These criticisms have been 
exacerbated by some administrative failures in the payment and calculation of the credits. 
Paradoxically the separation of Child Tax Credit from Working Tax Credit has ‘blunted 
work incentives’, and while the highest effective marginal tax rates have been reduced the 
number of those in work “facing an effective marginal tax rate of over 50%” has increased 
by almost 900,000 (Brewer and Shephard, 2004, p. viii). Another problem has been the 
significant disincentive to work now faced by the partners of those in households where 
someone is already claiming a tax credit  
 
Perhaps the greatest weakness in the overall ‘welfare to work’ strategy has, however, 
been the marginal impact achieved so far in reducing the numbers of working age people 
receiving sickness and disability benefits. The upward trend in Incapacity Benefit 
claimants inherited by New Labour has continued, albeit at a slower rate following the 
implementation of an ‘all work test’ developed under the Conservatives. Nevertheless the 
number of people of working age claiming incapacity related benefits continued to 
increase, to stand at some 2.7 million people, largely because those who do so are on 
average likely to receive the benefit for an average of twelve years. There has been 
intense political debate about ‘sick note’ Britain with the media and Opposition Parties 
arguing that the increase represents ‘hidden unemployment’ and is a testament to the 
failure of the New Deals (see, for example, Willets et al, 2003). There has also been 
much policy debate about these trends. One recent analysis concluded that both ‘push’ 
and ‘pull’ factors have been at work. Push factors include the collapse in demand for 
unskilled labour, the role of the stricter benefit regime for the unemployed and the 
relative laxness of medical professionals who are the ‘gatekeepers’ and issue required 
medical certificates. The pull factors include the higher level of invalidity relative to 
unemployment benefits both financially and in terms of weaker conditionality (Clasen et 
al, 2004, p. 22).  
 
The next phase: New Labour’s welfare reform strategy in a third term  
 
In many respects the ‘welfare to work’ strategy of a third Labour administration is 
embedded. A combination of policy statements on public sector reform, the continuing 
‘roll out’ of Jobcentre Plus, and the publication of DWP’s ‘five year strategy’, have 
together shaped a ‘second wave’ of welfare reform to be consolidated in further welfare 
reform legislation if Labour is re-elected. The Prime Minister has indicated that the 
Government now has an ‘aspiration’ to secure an overall employment rate of 80 per cent 
and, in the DWP plan this is defined as “a modern vision of full employment that will 
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eliminate pockets of marginalisation and extend real employment opportunity for all” 
(DWP, 2005, p. 6). 
 
The key aims of the strategy involve reducing the numbers receiving sickness and 
disability benefits; improving the employment rate of lone parents (to 70% by 2010); 
reducing black and minority ethnic unemployment rates; and improving employment 
rates in areas that have stubborn concentrations of ‘worklessness’. There are other 
significant policies amongst which is a new entitlement for low skilled adults to free 
‘level 2’ training and the introduction of a comprehensive youth allowance for 16 to 19 
year olds. These proposals, and the new developments described below, reflect a growing 
ambition to address the limits to ‘employment first’ programmes with labour market 
trends indicating a continuing decline in the demand for unskilled labour. 
 
Jobcentre Plus heads the strategy and the creation of a new front line system of integrated 
employment assistance and benefit offices will be linked with significant change that will 
‘decentralise’ and ‘localise’ New Deal employment programmes. During its first phase of 
reform the Government prioritised a concerted drive from the centre to tackle high 
unemployment and give a work focus to the benefit system. The next phase requires a 
“centralised intervention system combined with a more decentralised approach” (DWP, 
2004b). District Managers and PAs will have greater flexibility to tailor provision to meet 
local needs. Jobcentre Plus Districts will test the new system in 2005 prior to its 
extension. This process will be ‘benchmarked’ by further experimentation with private 
sector provision, as in Employment Zones2, to provide a further ‘spur’ to improving 
public sector performance. 
 
Jobcentre Plus will play the front line role in implementing the increased 
‘responsibilities’ required of workless people. From 2005 unemployed people must 
demonstrate greater efforts to look for work and to travel for jobs. There will be greater 
variation in ‘signing on’ regimes. A more intensive regime, involving sequences of WFIs, 
will be targeted at disability benefit claimants and lone parents with older children. 
‘Pathways to Work’ will be extended nationally and more claimants will have to attend 
up to eight interviews with a PA. Within ‘Pathways’ PAs can refer claimants to a range 
of assistance including ‘condition management programmes’, under development with 
the NHS, that involve rehabilitation support to enable an individual to manage and cope 
with health conditions, such as, back pain, angina, or mental illness. 
 
The ‘Pathways’ approach will expand dramatically after the reform of IB which is to be 
replaced by a new ‘Rehabilitation and Support Allowance’ (RSA) for those with ‘more 
manageable conditions’ and a ‘Disability and Sickness Allowance’ (DSA) for those with 
‘severe conditions’ (DWP, 2005). Initially claimants will be placed on a ‘holding 
                                                 
2 Whilst the Government gave the public sector responsibility for delivering the New Deals, it expanded the 
role of the private sector. The most significant variation on the New Deal model is in 15 areas where the 
Government introduced Employment Zones (EZs). Originally aimed at long term unemployed people over 
25, these have been extended to the younger unemployed and lone parents. The EZs represent an 
alternative private sector led approach to the more prescriptive New Deal model.2 In about one in ten ES 
districts private sector contractors deliver the New Deals for the unemployed. Together these ‘private 
public partnerships’ represent a significant injection of competition into the employment assistance system. 
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benefit’, paid at JSA rates, and, after medical assessment, those eligible for RSA will be 
paid extra only if they participate in WFIs and work related activities.  DSA claimants 
will receive more than current IB rates and, although required to attend a WFI, will 
participate in other work related activities on a voluntary basis.  
 
There remains a commitment to develop the evidence base on ‘what works’ in 
employment programmes. A new generation of pilot programmes have commenced and 
will test initiatives to help those with the greatest employment barriers; reduce ‘recycling’ 
through programmes; and improve employment retention and advancement (ERA). In 
doing so the Government has looked to other countries, in particular the USA, for models 
of what works, and is adapting and implementing initiatives. Two of the most significant 
of these pilot programmes draw directly on US experience. ‘Step Up’, for example, is a 
temporary employment programme that recruits young people who would otherwise 
recycle through the New Deals and is based in part on the ‘transitional’ and ‘community’ 
jobs programmes that have emerged in states like Washington and Wisconsin (Finn and 
Simmonds, 2003). There is also a major randomised ‘ERA’ experiment launched in 2004 
that aims to implement and test what has been learned from the many US initiatives that 
have been targeted at improving job retention amongst welfare recipients who take up jobs.  
 
Efforts are also being made to create better connections between Jobcentre Plus and the 
workforce development system that is delivered in England through ‘Learning and Skills 
Councils’. As part of a ‘New Deal for Skills’ a series of reforms aim to create greater 
articulation between the national and local work of Jobcentre Plus and the LSCs 
including the co-location of guidance and skills counsellors alongside PAs in Jobcentres. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The British Government’s combination of New Deal programmes, ‘make work pay’, and 
personalised employment assistance, has contributed to employment growth and poverty 
reduction. The effective implementation of the ‘second wave’ of welfare reform in itself 
would represent a significant achievement but a third term Labour Government must do 
more than consolidate its existing strategy. It is unlikely that Jobcentre Plus can focus on 
employment assistance without a radical simplification of the benefit system. Otherwise 
the new agency could become mired in administrative complexity, exacerbated by 
continuing IT inadequacies. There is a challenge to develop policies, such as an 
‘advancement agency’ to create ‘ladders of opportunity’ for those who ‘work first’ but 
are trapped in low paid jobs and the ‘tax credit economy’ (Denham, 2004). More 
fundamental questions concerning the future potential of tax credits to improve work 
incentives and reduce child poverty remain unresolved and there will be major obstacles 
in ‘joining up’ the ‘employment first’ system with education and training provision to 
create pathways to better quality jobs.  
 
Within the UK New Labour’s strategy also continues to be controversial and there are 
flaws. The Opposition Parties have criticised the New Deals as ineffective and expensive 
and if elected to power will abolish them; with the Conservatives also committed to the 
privatisation of the Jobcentre network. There are significant levels of opposition within 
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the Labour Party itself, with public sector unions campaigning against job cuts and 
further privatisation, and others deeply suspicious of benefit reductions and increased 
conditionality targeted at those on disability benefits. Critics also have questioned the 
equity, viability and limitations of a broad strategy that they argue places a 
disproportionate focus on improving employability and on paid employment being the 
primary route to social inclusion for all working age people (Lister, 2001). The 
‘employment first’ strategy will quickly be discredited should it seem to devalue the 
unpaid tasks of caring and the position of those unable to work or facing discrimination 
in the labour market. Benefit levels for those unable to work are still inadequate and 
resources will be needed to devise alternative routes out of poverty and social exclusion 
for these groups. 
 
One looming factor is that the new arrangements have yet to face the hardest test as they 
have so far been implemented in the context of a growing economy. Many of those 
getting jobs as a result of ‘employment first’ are likely to be amongst the first victims of 
any recession. The real test will then be whether they are able to get back into work faster 
than they otherwise would have done and whether Jobcentre Plus will be able to sustain 
its focus on employment assistance in a context of increased caseloads. 
 
Notwithstanding these caveats, this analysis of the welfare reform strategy pursued by the 
British Labour Government indicates one way in which ‘institutional arrangements’ have 
been adapted in the context of the challenges identified by the ‘TLM’ approach. The 
strategy may in large part be a product of internal, country-specific factors, but it does 
represent also an increasingly rich evidence-based source of lessons for others. 
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